GGP Shenanigans: How much value do you place on the credibility of management?

August 11, 2008 – 8:41 pm

This is a continuation of GGP and the type of investigative analysis you will not get from your brokerage house, basically an update to include the latest earnings information. And yes, this is still the type of stuff you will not get from your local brokerage house… [Note: this document had several typos that made it through an edit. I mistakenly typed the word LIE and several variations of it, and the strikeout formatting didn't denote my corrections. My bad...]

Table of Contents

  • Near term debt situationg: How has their near term debt maturity situation evolved? Not well
  • Net debt position: What can we learn from the evolution of their net debt position? Rapidly growing without any improvement in near term maturities
  • Bond by bond debt analysis: What can we learn from a bond by bond view of their debt? It appears they made zero progress in Q2
  • The CFO lied left open the potential to for extreme misunderstanding by shareholders and analysts: GGP’s CFO *Lied* Made Potentially and /or Materially Misleading Claims in Q1 2008’s Conference Call, so it would be of questionable prudence to trust their statements about their debt position
  • Revolver: Did the revolver come back? - Yes, and is now larger than before
  • Development capex: They cut by $600M last Q to $1.5B through 2012, or $316M per year. Any more or less? — They are cutting back as much as they can
  • Lease termination income: How does lease termination income compare? Still well above where they should be!
  • Asset sales: Selling any assets? Any “fire sale”? — Backing off from asset sale comments
  • No comment from John Bucksbaum in the PR announcement for the Q
  • Life insurance comments: Any change in tone about help from life insurance companies? - Yes, there was little commentary about them
  • Sales metrics: How were occupancy, comp sales and rental rates? - Up, and yet not profitable
  • Miscellaneous factors: Were there any loans from unconsolidated affiliates and retained debt? How is the collateral position? Any note from the IRS on the tax restructuring? — Waiting for the call
  • Income statement profitability: How is the profitability when we plug it into the financial cash flow model? - Inclusive of dividend, lost $37M Read the rest of this entry »

Citi and Wachovia downgrade GGP, after a 50% drop in price

July 31, 2008 – 10:49 pm

Citi and Wachovia downgrade GGP after it gets cut in half. Great job fellas! Unfortunately, I couldn’t afford to be a client of yours. I just don’t have the money to spare. For those new to the site, I started my bear positions in GGP in November of last year and released research to the site in December, a full 9 months and 100% before the big guys caught on. See the latest summary. I have had an interesting history with this company. Do you remember when the CFO sent out that press release 9 pm Saturday evening trying to diss me and Herb Greenberg? How about the stabs they took at me during their conference call, referring to my erroneous and unprofessional research (it’s all in the summary if you’re interested in reading up on it)? It appears that I, and my very professional team, have been quite accurate to date regarding GGP’s situation. I wonder if they will now send out an apology press release this weekend.  Read the rest of this entry »

When the best of the best start with the shenanigans, what does that mean for the rest…

July 31, 2008 – 10:48 pm

My team has finished the Amex analysis, and it is interesting. Amex is considered the creme de la creme of credit card lenders, with a premium upscale consumer and business clientele that generally does not carry balances on their cards. Well, don’t believe the hype. A little more on this later.

A quick note… I will change the format in which I distribute my opinions by including highlights in HTML and reserving the bulk of the opinion (including valuation) for download and/or physical distribution at one of my events. Less work formatting and fixing stuff for me. In addition, if you meet me personally, you can get to ask me questions as long as it is not investment advice. Thus far, Amex and HSBC are up next, then the next two phases of my investment thesis are on tap.

SUMMARY OF MY OPINIONS ON AMERICAN EXPRESS

The deteriorating consumer credit environment in the US has seen large credit card companies, including American Express (AXP), witness large write-offs and provisions in the last two quarters. AXP reported 2Q2008 net income from continuing operations of $655 million, or 56 cents a share, down from $1.04 billion or 86 cents a share in 2Q2007, off higher-than-expected provisions on its credit card lending portfolio. Credit metrics for AXP continue to weaken with 30 days past due card loans and 90 days past due card receivables rising to one of their highest levels ever at 3.9% and 3.0%, respectively, in 2Q2008. Amid the continuing US housing price decline, rising unemployment levels and increasing energy, commodity and food prices borne from burgeoning inflationary pressures, we expect AXP’s delinquent credit card payments, credit cards defaults and losses to rise over the current levels. This coupled with rising funding cost off hastily dwindling liquidity in the credit markets, near non-existent securitization activities in the US, and deceleration in AXP’s core credit card income due to slackening consumer spending, should weigh on AXP’s near-to-medium-term earnings. However, we believe that AXP’s liquidity position remains reasonable to weather the current difficult operating environment, particularly as the Company is expected to receive approximately $880 million annually for the next three years consequent to a favorable settlement of antitrust lawsuit against MasterCard and Visa.

II. KEY POINTS

Credit card companies to face macro-economic headwinds. Problems of credit card companies are likely to amplify with rising probability of increased customer defaults. Higher inflation, rising unemployment levels and declining housing prices have intensified concerns about increased credit card losses that could dampen earnings of credit card companies. AXP’s credit metrics continue to weaken with a record rise in delinquent loans and receivables, necessitating increased provision for loan losses over the past few quarters.

AXP’s inadequate reserves and higher expected delinquencies to amplify provisions. AXP’s total reserves for loan losses increased from 3.2% at the end of 2007 to 4.1% at the end of 2Q2008 as the company created additional credit lending reserves of $600 mn in 2Q2008 in expectation of higher credit card losses. However, with rapidly growing credit card loan write-offs and lag in reserves-to-credit losses, AXP will have to create higher lending reserves in the coming periods, exerting downward pressure on its earnings.

Slowdown in consumer spending to impact AXP’s credit card billing business. With US consumer confidence index touching its lowest level since 1992, the effect of slowing consumer spending is expected to hit hard on revenues of credit card companies. AXP has already felt the brunt of decelerating consumer spending in its US credit card business, which witnessed a negative growth of 0.33% in 2Q2008. Consumer spending outside the US has also been impacted by weakening of the global macro-environment.

Lower discount rate to further intensify revenue slowdown. AXP’s discount rate has witnessed a persistent downward slide since 2006 off changes in business mix and pricing discounts led by competitive pressures. AXP’s discount revenues, which currently contribute nearly 47% to the Company’s revenues (gross of interest expense), are likely to remain under pressure, in the near-to-medium term, due to lower discount rates.

Lack of short-term liquidity and lower securitization activities to impact company’s funding strategy and net interest margins. Increased counterparty credit risk in the fast deteriorating credit market has resulted in the rapid dwindling of short-term funding sources. This has caused AXP’s increased reliance on higher cost long-term funds over the past few quarters. We believe that the funding cost is set for higher interest rates amid continuing widening of spreads and perceived higher losses in the financial sector. The problem is likely to be aggravated by AXP’s recently downgraded ratings by S&P and rapidly declining securitization activities in the US, forcing AXP’s net interest margins on a trip down south.

Valuation, Assumptions, and Pro Forma sections are available for download via the full report:icon AXP Consolidated final (437.96 kB 2008-07-30 15:11:32) or through one of my BoomBustBlog events only.

Financial Highlights

AXP’s credit metrics continue to weaken

Increased delinquency as customers fall behind scheduled payment dates. A worsening macro-economic environment in the US has led to increased credit card delinquency rates and record charge-offs in the last two years. As per FDIC data, in 1Q2008 credit card charge-offs and delinquency rate in the US increased to 4.7% and 4.9%, respectively, from 3.1% and 3.9% in 1Q2006. The trend is expected to lead to a more difficult situation amid rising unemployment levels, slowing business activities and weakening fundamentals in the US.

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Source: FDIC

Read the rest of this entry »

GGP Shenanigans?

July 31, 2008 – 10:46 pm

According to Reuters, GGP said on Wednesday that funds from operations rose 8.4 percent, in part from the acquisition of a former partnership. Second-quarter funds from operations, or FFO, were $228 million, or 71 cents per share, compared with $210.3 million, or 71 cents per share, in the prior year.

There is a lot of this going on lately, where companies caught in the asset securitization crisis move the goal posts 100 feet closer then proclaim a touchdown. GGP is assuming we are not smart enough to notice they are comparing apples to oranges in a citrus beauty contest. Let’s see… They are stating FFO, which just may exclude the charges and costs that needed to be taken to complete the acquisition for the “former partnership”. Despite this, they failed to forget to include the operating funds from said partnership acquisition in thier results.

Who would dare bet me that if we were to compare same property net results from last year we would see a significant decline? Okay, no takers? How about betting me on the effect of the inclusion of all expenses and revenues in their numbers ending up showing a business in trouble during even more troubling macro economic times?

I will be posting some shenanigans from American Express and a full forensic exam of both Amex and HSBC in a few hours (translated, when I get around to it), then that will probably be it for the financials. I have been moving into the next two phases of my investment thesis for the past month or so. I think I was first for various financials, almost first with the monolines, early on the homebuilders and a front runner on the REITS, but these spaces have gotten very crowded and are departing from their fundamentals.

I will be posting an open, all blogger welcome, get together at Buddahkahn restaurant in NYC’s meat packing district in a few hours as well. For all of you single guys and gals out there who like to “pretty people” watch, this is the gathering for you.

An act of desperation, or the best way to Disrespect your current shareholders?

July 31, 2008 – 10:44 pm

Reposting: Capital, Leverage and Loss in the Banking system

July 31, 2008 – 10:43 pm

Back by popular demand (and broken links) - Capital, Leverage and Loss in the Banking System.

Excerpt:  As you can see, there are quite a few banks, some with well known brand names. I have defined leverage as tier 1 capital divided by average quarterly assets. Tier 1 capital ratios that drop below 6% invite regulatory intervention, which is why banks are in such a hissy fit to raise capital against the backdrop of all of all of those losses. Don’t be fooled by the snake oil salesman line of “these asset values will return to a profitable position when the market gets back to normal”. This is Reggie on earth beaming a message to all of those on Planet Overly Optimistic, the market is back to normal. If you lever up and buy a bunch of assets at the top of a bubble with borrowed money, you will be losing a lot on the way down. The market will not return to those bubble levels, on a real basis, for DECADES! Simple look back and let history speak for itself. Look at the charts below, and think of the morgtage and CDO assets as Yahoo stock Q1 200o. You, as a super smart banker, buy a million shares of Yahoo Stock on margin for $122 per share, using only $50 per share of your money since you are so smart, of course. Your plan is to take these shares, turn around and flip them to your clients for a profit, but all of a sudden the market drops and you are stuck with the product on your balance sheets.

yhoo.chart.gif

Well, you tell your clients that the market is acting irrational and will return, we just have to wait it out. So, you have $61,000,000 of your capital tied up in $122,000,000 of this tech stock waiting for the market to return. In the mean time, the market drops the price to $15 by the end of the year, effectively wiping clean all of your equity and forcing you to recieve the margin call from hell. But wait, you told your clients, accountants, lawyers, investors and regulators that this was temporary blip and values will return back to pre-bubble times. You see, that was Freudian slip. The asset values did return back to pre-bubble levels, but you bought your assets at the peak of a bubble, and leveraged up on top of it. When that return to the mean comes, it will devastate those who used leverage. This scenario is only using 50% leverage, or 2:1. The banks on my Doo-Doo list are using leverage above 6:1 to 11:1. Reference the first chart to see a sampling.

The next step in my investment thesis

July 31, 2008 – 10:42 pm

BoomBustBlogger Goatmug has literally read my mind in a very recent comment, thus I have taken the liberty to post his comment as an official blog post. This is what I have had my team working on for the past few weeks. I would have had some tangible results earlier, but the financial mess is more involved than anyone could have guessed. That government put option assignment didn’t help any either. I would also like to thank all for the supportive words regarding my effort with the blog. Don’t worry, I will continue to push out hardcore analysis. I can’t guarantee it will always be free, but I can guarantee it will be accessible to those who appreciate its value and will be of value to those who share my values and contrarian perspectives.

From Goatmug:

I just read this, some of Thain’s comments regarding capital raising from a Reuters article.

Read the rest of this entry »

Anatomy of a Sick Bank - Repost

July 31, 2008 – 10:40 pm

For those who requested this link, the Anatomy of a Sick Bank! It is easiest just to perform a search for the title that you are looking for. I will be updating the system to make it more user friendly in the very near future.

I have scheduled another high net worth boat ride, for those who are in that category and are interested in hearing my thoughts and views in person while meeting those of like-minded ilk.

The Fed and non-borrowed funds

July 31, 2008 – 10:38 pm

A few readers were commenting on the significance of the following and I have decided to throw my two cents in: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/current/

Non-borrowed Funds

As a result of increased counterparty risk inter-bank borrowings between the banks had dried up. In response, Federal Reserve (Fed), in December 2007, announced Term Auction Facility (TAF) to facilitate banks to borrow directly from Fed against a wide range of collaterals. The interest rate on the borrowing was decided to be determined through an auction process.

A plunge in non-borrowed reserves (total reserves minus borrowed reserves) since January 2008 has attracted a lot of attention in the financial community to argue if it signaled distress in the US banking system.

One would need to understand the flow of money to assess the underlying essence of transaction. The money was lent to banks, and for each dollar lent through the TAF the Fed was careful to liquidate a dollar of its holdings of Treasury bills and bonds to keep its overall balance sheet unchanged. The money borrowed by banks under TAF by Fed was classified as borrowed funds, the figure of which was subtracted from total reserves.

Essentially, it amounted to indirect lending by banks to each other through Fed. To understand clearly, please see the diagram below. Bank 2 borrows from Fed under TAF against collaterals. Fed sells an equal amount of Treasury bills to Bank 1 to raise an equal amount. As a result, the amount received from Bank 1 is being used to lend to Bank 2. The TAF didn’t add to the money supply in the economy as Fed liquidates its holdings of Treasury bills for amount of dollar lent through the TAF. The figure of negative non-borrowed reserves in Fed’s balance sheet is represented by issuance of treasuries and bonds to banks.

Intermediately role of Fed

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I told you so, AGO

July 31, 2008 – 10:35 pm

For those who are new to the blog, I have had heavy short positions and a lot of research performed on the monoline insurers as far back as the 3rd quarter of last year. It has paid off handsomely, despite the fact that many pundits had argued, tooth and nail, against my findings. Well, the market has spoken, and all of the monolines negatively blogged have reached the ending that I anticipated, if not worse. The business models just do not make sense for the derivative markets.

See my AGO primer and the full forensic analysis. These are some of my comments on the other monolines last year when they were trading in the 60’s and 70’s:

  1. A Super Scary Halloween Tale of 104 Basis Points Pt I & II, by Reggie Middleton
  2. Tie-in to the Halloween Story
  3. Welcome to the World of Dr. FrankenFinance!
  4. Ambac is Effectively Insolvent & Will See More than $8 Billion of Losses with Just a $2.26 Billion
  5. Follow up to the Ambac Analysis
  6. Monolines swoon, CDOs go boom & I really wonder why the ratings agencies are given any credibili
  7. More tidbits on the monolines
  8. What does Brittany Spears, Snow White and MBIA have in Common?
  9. Moody’s Affirms Ratings of Ambac and MBIA & Loses any Credibility They May Have Had Left
  10. My Analyst’s Comments on MBIA/Ambac/Moody’s Post
  11. As was warned in this blog, the S&P downgrade of a monoline insurer reverberated losses through c

Here is a blurb from Bloomberg regarding AGO’s price movement today:

Assured Guaranty Plunges, Bond Risk Soars on Review (Update1) Read the rest of this entry »